DECIDES:

1. The contested provisions of articles 25 par. (1), 26 and 27 points 1) and 7) of Law no. 64-XII of May 31, 1990 regarding the Government, in the wording of Law no. 5 of January 12, 2011.

2. This decision is final, may not be subject to any appeal, shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova.

JUDGEMENT
FOR THE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
the provisions of Articles 25 paragraphs (1), 26 and 27 points 1) and 7) of Law no. 64-XII of May 31, 1990 on the Government,
with subsequent amendments

(Notification no. 26a / 2011)

CHIŞINĂU
December 8, 2011

On behalf of the Republic of Moldova,

The Constitutional Court, ruling on:

Mr Alexandru TĂNASE, President,

Mr Petru RAILEAN, Judge-Rapporteur,

Mr Dumitru PULBERE,

Mr. Victor PUŞCAŞ,

Mrs. Elena SAFALERU,

Ms Valeria ŞTERBEŢ, Judges,

with the participation of Mrs. Dina Musteaţa, clerk,

Having regard to the notification lodged on 28 July 2011, registered on 1 August 2011 and completed on 29 September 2011,

Having considered the above referral in plenary,

Having regard to the documents and works of the file,

Make the following decision:

PROCEDURE

1. At the origin of the case is the notification submitted to the Constitutional Court on August 1, 2011, pursuant to articles 135 par. (1) letter a) of the Constitution, 25 para. (1) lit. g) of the Law on the Constitutional Court and 38 para. (1) lit. g) of the Code of Constitutional Jurisdiction of Members of Parliament Tudor Deliu, Valeriu Strelet, Gheorghe Mocanu, Grigore Cobzac, Nae-Simion Pleşca, Elena Frumosu, Maria Nasu, Lilia Zaporojan for the control of the constitutionality of article 26 of Law no. 64-XII of May 31, 1990 on the Government, which regulates the formation and activity of the Government Presidium.

2. The authors of the notification claimed, in particular, that the Government Presidium has no constitutional basis and is an instrument of undermining / substituting the tasks of the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole in decision-making, the contested provisions being contrary to articles 1 par. (3), 96 para. (1), 97, 101 para. (1) and 102 par. (5) of the Constitution.

3. On September 29, 2011 the notification was completed with the request to extend the object of the notification on the provisions of articles 25 par. (1) and 27 points 1) and 7) of the Law on Government, as being in connection with the provisions of article 26 of the law.

4. By the decision of the Constitutional Court of August 25, 2011, the notification was declared admissible, without prejudice to the merits of the case.

5. In the process of examining the referral, the Constitutional Court requested the opinions of the Parliament, the Government and the ministries.

6. At the public plenary sitting of the Court, the authors of the referral were represented by Mr Tudor Deliu, Member of Parliament. The Parliament was represented by Sergiu Chirică, main consultant within the Legal Department of the Parliament Secretariat. The Government was represented by Mr Oleg Efrim, Minister of Justice.

RELEVANT LEGISLATION

7. The relevant provisions of the Constitution are the following:

Article 1
State of the Republic of Moldova

"(3) The Republic of Moldova is a rule of law, democratic, in which human dignity, his rights and freedoms, the free development of the human personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values ​​and are guaranteed."

Article 2
Sovereignty and state power

"(1) National sovereignty belongs to the people of the Republic of Moldova, which exercises it directly and through its representative bodies, in the forms established by the Constitution."

Article 5
Democracy and political pluralism

"(1) Democracy in the Republic of Moldova is exercised in the conditions of political pluralism, which is incompatible with dictatorship and totalitarianism."

Article 7
The Constitution, the Supreme Law

"The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova is its Supreme Law. No law or legal act contrary to the provisions of the Constitution shall have legal force. "

Article 60
Parliament, the supreme representative and legislative body

"(1) The Parliament is the supreme representative body of the people of the Republic of Moldova and the sole legislative authority of the state."

Article 66
Basic tasks

"Parliament has the following basic responsibilities:

a) adopts laws, decisions and motions;

c) interprets the laws and ensures the unity of the legislative regulations on the entire territory of the country;

d) approves the main directions of the internal and foreign policy of the state; [...]

f) exercises parliamentary control over the executive power, in the forms and within the limits provided by the Constitution; "

Article 72
Categories of laws

"(1) The Parliament adopts constitutional laws, organic laws and ordinary laws. [...]

(3) The organic law regulates:

d) the organization and functioning of the Government; [...] "

Article 74
Adoption of laws and decisions

"(3) The draft laws presented by the Government, as well as the legislative proposals of the deputies accepted by it shall be examined by the Parliament in the manner and according to the priorities established by the Government, including in the emergency procedure. Other legislative proposals shall be examined in the manner prescribed. "

Article 96
The role

„(1) The Government ensures the accomplishment of the internal and foreign policy of the state and exercises the general management of the public administration.

(2) In the exercise of its attributions, the Government shall be guided by its program of activity, accepted by the Parliament. "

Article 97
Structure

"The government is made up of the prime minister, first deputy prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers and other members established by organic law."

Article 101
Prime Minister

"(1) The Prime Minister leads the Government and coordinates the activity of its members, respecting their attributions. [...] "

Article 102
Government acts

"(1) The Government adopts decisions, ordinances and dispositions. [...]

(5) The provisions shall be issued by the Prime Minister for the organization of the internal activity of the Government. "

8. The relevant provisions of Law no. 64-XII of May 31, 1990 regarding the Government:

Article 25
Government meetings

"Government meetings are held as appropriate, but not less than once a quarter. The agenda of Government meetings shall be approved by it at the proposal of the Government Presidium. "

Article 26
Government Presidium

"In order to coordinate the internal activity of the Government and in order to approve the draft agenda of the Government meetings, the Presidium of the Government is formed, which includes the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers.

The meeting of the Government Presidium is convened by the Prime Minister and is considered deliberative if all members of the Presidium participate in it. In the absence of a Deputy Prime Minister, he shall delegate another member of the Government to attend the meeting with full rights.

Decisions in the Presidium of the Government shall be taken by consensus. "

Article 27
Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova

„The Prime Minister leads the Government and coordinates the activity of its members, respecting their attributions;

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova:

1) presides over the meetings of the Government and of its Presidium; [...]

7) presents for examination to the Presidium of the Government or puts before the President of the Republic of Moldova the question regarding the stimulation or application of disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government; [...] "

IN LAW

9. On 31 May 1990 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted Law no.64-XII on the Government.

10. Article 26, in the wording of the law in force until January 12, 2011, provided for the formation of the Presidium for the organization of the internal activity of the Government, composed of the Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and the Minister of Justice.

11. By Law no. 5 of January 12, 2011 on amending and supplementing Law no. 64-XII of 31 May 1990 on Government, Articles 25 and 26 were amended, amending the composition of the Presidium, excluding the Minister of Justice, and introducing the competence of the Presidium to approve the draft agenda of the Government meeting, and the phrase "organization of the internal activity of the Government" was replaced by the phrase "coordination of the internal activity of the Government".

12. At the same time, the rules of Article 27 points 1) and 7), which provide for the competence of the Prime Minister to chair the meetings of the Presidium and to present for examination to the Presidium of the Government or to put before the President of the Republic of Moldova the issue of stimulus or the application of disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government, did not undergo any changes.

13. The authors of the notification consider that the Government Presidium has no constitutional basis and is an instrument of undermining / substituting the tasks of the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole in making decisions, the contested provisions being contrary to articles 1 par. (3), 2 para. (1), 96 para. (1), 97, 101 para. (1) and 102 par. (5) of the Constitution.

14. The Court notes that the prerogative with which it was vested by Article 135 para. (1) lit. a) of the Constitution implies the establishment of the correlation between the legislative norms and the text of the Constitution, taking into account the principle of its supremacy.

15. In this context, the Constitutional Court will analyze the contested legal provisions in the light of the constitutional norms invoked by the author of the notification. In this regard, the Court will examine the alleged violation of Articles 1 para. (3) and 97 of the Constitution - in the part related to the formation of the Presidium of the Government, and the violation of articles 2 par. (1), 96 para. (1), 101 para. (1) and art. 102 para. (5) of the Constitution - in the part related to its competence.

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 1 PARAGRAPH. (3) AND 97 OF THE CONSTITUTION

16. According to the authors of the complaint, the Presidium of the Government is an entity not expressly provided for in the Constitution, so that its formation violates Article 97 of the Constitution, which provides for the following structure of the Government:

"The government is made up of the prime minister, first deputy prime minister, deputy prime ministers, ministers and other members established by organic law."

17. In this context, the authors of the notification consider that Article 1 paragraph (3) of the Constitution, which enshrines the Republic of Moldova as a rule of law, is violated.

A. Arguments of the authors of the notification

18. According to the authors of the notification, the Constitution does not regulate the status of an auxiliary body, which should coordinate the activity of the Government, adopting opposable decisions for the entire cabinet of ministers, and therefore, the contested norms lack a constitutional basis.

B. Findings of the Court

19. The Court notes that the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution is based on the superior position of the Fundamental Law within the hierarchy of the legal system, which generates constitutional supralegality, applicable to the whole system, so that the law expresses the general will only in compliance with the constitutional norm.

20. At the same time, the Court observes that the regulations of the Constitution, in accordance with the regulations of other constitutions, took into account only the specification, in principle, of the structure, organization and establishment of the Government and the bodies forming the central public administration. Specialized.

Therefore, the structure, role and functions of these bodies have not been regulated in a generic and exhaustive manner, just as the constitutional norms do not distinguish in this respect the role and functions of the local public administration authorities. In these cases, it is the legislator who identifies the situations in which these bodies appear and outlines their role.

21. Moreover, even if the diversity and specialization of the fields of foreign and domestic policy of the state required a detail of the constitutional provisions regarding the role and structure of the Government, such an approach would exceed the scope of the norms of the Constitution, norms that regulate fundamental social relations. they are essential for the establishment, maintenance and exercise of power.

22. Starting from this premise, the provisions of articles 72 par. (3) letters d) and 97 of the Fundamental Law enshrine the principle of regulatory parliamentary autonomy, applicable in the matter of organization and functioning of the Government, based on which the Parliament develops by organic law the constitutional norms regarding its organization and functioning.

23. In this context, the possibility (and even the obligation of the Parliament) to intervene in the organization of the Government's activity, by enacting legislative acts in order to develop the constitutional norms regarding the organization and functioning of the Government, appears to be clearly outlined.

24. Without intending to make a political analysis of the appropriateness of the measures taken or of their effects, the Court considers that, in these circumstances, the provisions of Articles 72 and 97 of the Constitution not only do not exclude the plan, but, on the contrary, provide the possibility of the Parliament to intervene by legislative means regarding the functioning of the Government, but with the observance of the primary constitutional provisions.

25. Moreover, Article 97 of the Constitution nominates only members of the Government, not any entities, which may be formed to coordinate the work of the Government. Moreover, it is clear that the Presidium is, in essence, a fragment of a public authority, and not a public authority, in the legal sense of the term.

26. In this regard, it is clear that the possibility for the Parliament to legislate - as the primary legislative authority - of the Government Presidium falls within the scope of the legislative forum.

27. Therefore, the formation of the Presidium, although not included in the constitutional norm, cannot be qualified as determining, in itself, its unconstitutionality, thus not violating the principle of the rule of law, enshrined in Article 1 para. (3) of the Constitution.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 PARAGRAPH. (1), 96 ALIN. (1), 101 PARAGRAPH (1) AND 102 PARIN. (5) OF THE CONSTITUTION

28. According to the complainants, the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on Government, according to which the Presidium adopts the draft agenda of the Government meeting undermines / substitutes the tasks of the Government established in Article 96 of the Constitution:

„(1) The Government ensures the accomplishment of the internal and foreign policy of the state and exercises the general management of the public administration.

(2) In the exercise of its attributions, the Government shall be guided by its program of activity, accepted by the Parliament. "

29. The complainants also claim that the contested rules of Articles 25, 26 and 27 (7) of the Law on Government, according to which the Presidium proposes the draft agenda of Government meetings, coordinates the internal activity of the Government and examines the proposal Prim - the Minister regarding the stimulation or application of disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government, violates article 101 par. (1) of the Constitution, which provides the following:

"The Prime Minister leads the Government and coordinates the activity of its members, respecting their attributions."

30. In the same context, the authors of the notification consider that the Presidium violates the competence of the Prime Minister, established in article 102 par. (5) of the Constitution, to issue provisions for the organization of the internal activity of the Government.

A. Arguments of the authors of the notification

31. The complainants consider that the Presidium of the Government has become an instrument of undermining / substituting the tasks of the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole in decision-making, remaining at the discretion only of the selected members to determine from the outset which policies are priority ignore.

32. According to the authors of the complaint, the fact that the dignitaries-members of the Presidium, cumulative with the position of Deputy Prime Minister, are also ministers who lead within the competences of the entrusted fields, denotes a , in addition to the objectives resulting from the Program of Activity, which obtained the vote of confidence of the Parliament, the ministries may present other initiatives, the importance and resonance of which is left to the appreciation of only some members of the Government, and not the entire cabinet. . Such a state of affairs would be, in the view of the authors of the complaint, contrary to the principles of democracy, based on plenary representation, participation and transparency.

33. The complainants consider that the contested provisions are contrary to the democratic spirit of decision-making, according to which Government decisions are adopted by a majority of Government members present at the meeting, while ordinances may be adopted by a majority of Government members.

34. Also, the authors of the notification consider that only the Prime Minister has the competence to organize the internal activity of the Government, because he issues provisions in this respect.

B. Findings of the Court

35. The Court notes that the contested rules concerning the functioning of the Presidium relate to its powers concerning: (a) proposing the draft agenda of Government meetings; (b) coordinating the internal work of the Government; (c) examining the proposals of the Prime Minister regarding the stimulation or application of disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government. In this context, when verifying the constitutionality of the contested rules, the Court will examine each of these jurisdictions separately.

1. Proposal of the draft agenda of the Government meetings

36. The Court notes that the role of the Government, as provided for in Article 96 of the Constitution, is distinguished by the fact that it is expressly provided for in the constitutional provisions, being a dichotomous one - political and administrative. The Law on Government mentions, expressis verbis, the mechanisms and functions that the Government has to carry out the government program.

37. In this regard, the Court notes that the provisions governing the formation and activity of the Presidium of the Government do not indicate the purpose of undermining the activity of the Prime Minister or substituting his or the Government's role in decision-making. This is also confirmed by the fact that the Presidium meetings are convened at the initiative of the Prime Minister, who chairs both the Government meetings and the Presidium meetings, and the decisions within the Presidium are adopted by consensus.

38. The Court also sees no basis for considering that the functions of the Presidium would be contrary to the role of the Government.

39. Thus, Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on Government imperatively establish the manner of adopting the agenda of the Government meeting, as follows: (1) The Presidium approves the draft agenda of Government meetings; (2) The Government approves the agenda of its meetings, at the proposal of the Presidium.

40. The analysis of this text shows that, through these norms, the following rules are established: (1) the draft agenda approved by the Presidium has the value of a proposal; (2) the final decision belongs to the Government.

41. In this connection, the Court notes that the Government, by virtue of its role established by law, is not only able but also the only authority entitled to take the final decision on the agenda of its sittings. Therefore, the role of the Cabinet of Ministers is par excellence decisive in establishing the priorities on the agenda of its meetings, as an ad validitatem condition, which cannot be minimized or annihilated by the Presidium's preparation of the draft agenda.

42. Last but not least, the criticism of unconstitutionality, formulated by the authors of the complaint, according to which the contested norms contain regulations contrary to the democratic spirit of decision-making, does not subsist, given the reasons developed below.

43. In this regard, the Court notes that decisions in the Presidium of the Government are taken by consensus, just as the majority rule applies in Government meetings.

44. In the same vein, the Court draws attention to the fact that the exercise of the vote is the main work of the Government as a whole, as a collective decision-making body.

45. Consequently, even if apparently the possibility of forming the draft agenda by the Presidium would be limited to a small circle of members of the Government, the right of the Government to decide on the opportunity and content of the agenda is discretionary, the Cabinet of Ministers having the possibility to decide on the proposals regarding the modification or completion of the agenda, formulated by the members of the Government during its meeting.

46. ​​As long as it is possible to rule on a proposal from a member of the Government, it is clear that the Government can exercise real influence in setting the agenda of the Government meeting if necessary. The Court finds no reason to prevent members of the Government from exercising their prerogative to present proposals for amending or supplementing the agenda directly at the Government meeting, which has happened during the existence and operation of the Presidium.

47. In addition, the Court's public hearing found that no action by the Prime Minister proposed for debate could be held at the Government meeting, but not included in the draft agenda approved by the Presidium, which had been rejected.

48. Also, in the public hearing of the Court, it was found that the functioning of the Government Presidium did not generate, neither during 2011, in which the contested norms acted in the wording of Law no.5 of 12 January 2011, nor during the previous years of existence of the Government Presidium, dysfunctions in the daily, normal activity of the ministries, but also of the Government.

49. Furthermore, the Court notes that the rules establishing the approval by the Presidium, by consensus, of the draft agenda of Government meetings replace the previous rules, according to which the Prime Minister unilaterally approves the draft agenda of Government meetings, this rule being more likely than the current one to generate doubts of political partisanship in promoting certain initiatives.

50. Therefore, in view of the above, the Court does not consider the argument of the complainants to have undermined the competence of the Prime Minister and to block the activity of the Government.

51. The Court also notes that the Presidium of the Government was created following negotiations between the leaders of the parliamentary groups for the formation of the Government, respecting, in principle, the political configuration of the Parliament. Thus, in a natural connection with the formation of the Government, the Presidium ensures the reflection, in the composition of its structure, of the political options in the Parliament that ensure the political support of the Government.

Therefore, the Prime Minister has the leverage to influence the composition of the government team and, implicitly, the composition of the Presidium, because, in accordance with Article 98 para. (2) of the Constitution, the candidate for the position of Prime Minister, within 15 days from the appointment, requires the vote of confidence of the Parliament on the activity program and the entire list of the Government, including Deputy Prime Ministers, who are part of the Presidium .

52. Because in a coalition government, in the conditions of political pluralism and multipartyism, it is necessary a permanent cooperation manifested through various forms and activities, between the exponents of its different components, it is important the mutual "tempering" of the tendencies of domination. replacing constitutional democracy with dictatorship.

53. Therefore, this mechanism cannot be regarded as a procedure for ignoring the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister to lead the Government, coordinating the activity of its members and issuing provisions for organizing the internal activity of the Government, as this method of activity represents, in a natural order of the mechanisms of the institutions of the rule of law, a collegiate consultative body in a restricted format.

54. At the same time, the Court cannot accept the argument of the complainants that the contested rules are contrary to Article 2 para. (1) of the Constitution, which enshrines the exercise of sovereignty by the people, directly or indirectly, in the forms established by the Constitution, because this norm finds its expression in voting (elections and referendum) and elective mandates.

55. In this regard, the Court notes that, according to Article 60 of the Constitution, the Parliament is the supreme representative body of the people of the Republic of Moldova. With its inauguration, the Parliament has the obligation to form the state bodies.

56. In this context, the Government is appointed by the President of the Republic of Moldova, who is the guarantor of sovereignty, based on the vote of confidence granted and the work program accepted by the Parliament, which is the representative authority to which the people delegate part of their sovereignty.

It belongs to him, which expresses the sovereign will of the people and represents its interests, transposing into political decisions its major options. Thus, by virtue of the constitutional norms, although it has as a source of legitimacy the will of the electoral majority, the Government does not have the mandate of the people to exercise sovereignty in its name and, therefore, article 2 par. (1) of the Constitution is irrelevant to the present case.

2. Coordination of the internal activity of the Government

57. The Court considers that the argument of the complainants that the contested rule is contrary to Article 101 (1) of the Constitution, which provides that the Prime Minister leads the Government and coordinates the activity of its members, respecting their powers, cannot be upheld either.

58. In the Court's view, it is clear that the contested legal rule and the constitutional rule relied on refer to different subjects: the constitutional rule on the competence of the Prime Minister refers to "members of [the Government]" as individual exponents, and the legal norm on the competence of the Presidium refers to "Government ", as a collegiate entity.

59. In this sense, the coordination by the Prime Minister of the activity of the members of the Government, provided by article 101 par. (1) of the Constitution, refers to the political dimension of their activities in carrying out the governing program, being in correlation with the solidary political responsibility, enshrined in paragraph (3) of the same article, which provides for the resignation of the Government in the event of resignation. the Minister.

60. With regard to the claim of the authors of the notification that the Prime Minister would have the exclusive competence to organize the internal activity of the Government, because, pursuant to article 102 par. (5) of the Constitution, issues provisions in this regard, the Court notes that this rule does not regulate the competence of the Prime Minister, which is established in Article 101 of the Constitution, but reflects the concern of the legislator to outline the categories of legal acts issued by the executive.

61. On the other hand, if the constituent legislator preferred to regulate, by the very fundamental law, the attributions of the head of state, as regards the Government, the task of consecrating his attributions and functioning belongs to the ordinary legislator.

62. Thus, with regard to the Government, the attention of the constituent legislator, but also of the ordinary one, was all the more directed towards its legal acts, considering that it is the one who exercises the general management of the public administration - administrative dimension of the constitutional role, even if the interdependence between it and the political dimension of this role cannot be denied or, at least, ignored.

But the realization of political values, of the promises expressed through the government program is one of the objectives of the newly appointed Government, achievable not only by it, even if it has a general material competence, but by an entire apparatus represented by public administration authorities. Consequently, the constituent legislator was concerned, with priority, with the regulation of the regime of legal acts that the Government can issue both for the application of the law, as a legal act issued by the legislature, and in the matter reserved to the latter.

63. Like most constitutions of other states, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova does not contain regulations regarding the possibility of ministries and other specialized central public administration bodies, as well as local public administration bodies, including their leaders, to issue or adopt legal acts, either with a normative character or with an individual character, the ordinary legislator having the task of outlining the legal regime of these acts.

The provisions of the Constitution, as well as those of the Law on the Government, recognize to the ministers a certain material competence, which implies the recognition, implicitly, of their right to issue normative acts through which to carry out their attributions. However, the acts issued in this way by the ministers should not be confused with those in the adoption of which the ministers participate as members of the Government, just as the latter should not be confused with the decisions adopted by the Presidium.

3. Examination of the Prime Minister's proposal regarding the stimulation or application of disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government

64. The Court notes that the contested Article 27 of the Law on Government governs the powers of the Prime Minister, not those of the Presidium. Thus, point 7 of article 27 of the law empowers the Prime Minister with the power to present for examination to the Presidium of the Government or to put before the President of the Republic of Moldova the issue of stimulating or applying disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government.

65. This general legal norm is developed by the Government Regulation, approved by the Government Decision no. 34 of January 17, 2001, with subsequent amendments and completions (M.O. no. 8-10 / 73, 2001).

66. The analysis of the text of the contested legal norm indicates that it establishes a discretionary competence of the Prime Minister to notify or not the Presidium of the Government regarding the stimulation or application of disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government.

67. At the same time, this discretion is an alternative, as it puts before the Prime Minister two options for stimulating or applying disciplinary sanctions against the member of the Government: either the notification of the Government Presidium, or the direct notification of the President of the Republic of Moldova.

68. Therefore, this rule does not infringe the constitutional powers of the Prime Minister either.

69. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the powers of the Presidium relating to the coordination of the Government's internal work, the proposal of the draft agenda of Government meetings, the examination of the Prime Minister's proposal to stimulate or impose disciplinary sanctions on the Government member are not nature to trigger institutional blockages if they are not followed by actions or inactions that may prevent the fulfillment of the constitutional attributions of the public authorities.

70. In this regard, the contested rules do not affect the responsibilities of the Prime Minister regarding the coordination of the political dimension of the activity of the Government members for the implementation of the government program, the exercise of administrative attributions regarding the internal activity of the Government.

71. Therefore, the competencies of the Government Presidium, in the wording of Law no. 5 of January 12, 2011, fall within the constitutional limits, being a mechanism that corresponds to the institutional system provided by the Constitution.

For these reasons, under Articles 140 of the Constitution, 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, 6, 61, 62 let. a) and 68 of the Code of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Constitutional Court

DECIDES:

1. The contested provisions of articles 25 par. (1), 26 and 27 points 1) and 7) of Law no. 64-XII of May 31, 1990 regarding the Government, in the wording of Law no. 5 of January 12, 2011.

2. This decision is final, may not be subject to any appeal, shall enter into force on the date of its adoption and shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova.

President                                                                                                  Alexandru TĂNASE

Chisinau, December 8, 2011

HCC no. 25

File no. 26a / 2011